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Abstract 
We recently rejected the hypothesis that increases in cybercrime may have caused the international crime drop. Crit-
ics subsequently argued that offenders switched from physical crime to cybercrime in recent years, and that lifestyle 
changes due to ‘leisure IT’ may have caused the international crime drop. Here we explain how the critics misrepre-
sented our argument and do not appear to introduce anything new.
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Cybercrime hypothesis
We recently rejected the cybercrime hypothesis as an 
explanation for the international crime drop (Farrell and 
Birks 2018). For the sake of clarity, here we reiterate this 
hypothesis—which we derived from the work of vary-
ing scholars quoted in our original manuscript (Farrell 
and Birks 2018: p1). By our definition, the cybercrime 
hypothesis remains a matter of substitution—such that, 
as offenders expend their finite resources to exploit 
increasing cybercrime opportunities, they necessarily 
must devote less resources to those associated with tradi-
tional crimes—and thus an increase in cybercrime causes 
a reduction in traditional crime.
In considering this cybercrime hypothesis, we offered 
argument and evidence to conclude that physical crime 
such as burglary and car theft did not decline because 
offenders shifted to online crimes. Our principal supposi-
tion was that the spread of the Internet occurred too late 
to account for the major declines in crime experienced 
across high income countries. We supplemented this 
with the argument that while some crimes such as fraud 
may have adopted online modus operandi in more recent 
years, this would be years after the start of the major 
crime declines.
Our work was subsequently criticized. The criti-
cism relating to cybercrime was that some crimes, such 
as fraud, may have adopted online modus operandi in 
recent years (Miro-Linares and Moneva 2019, hereaf-
ter M&M). This seems to be the same argument that 
we made. We wrote “A more plausible scenario is adap-
tive switching for cyber-assisted crime such as fraud—if 
offenders recognized the opportunity and acquired the 
resources and skills. However … this would still occur too 
late to account for the decline in physical crimes.” (Farrell 
and Birks 2018: 2, emphasis added).
Our critics show that online banking fraud in the UK 
increased from 2007 while check fraud declined, from 
which they infer substitution by offenders who preferred 
online crime for whatever reason. There are other plau-
sible explanations for both trends. A general decline in 
check use would reduce the number of opportunities for 
check fraud, for example. Moreover, there seems to be 
no evidence in our critics’ data indicating the proposed 
substitution effect. Perhaps more importantly for pre-
sent purposes, if some substitution did occur 15 years or 
so after physical crime’s decline, this would support our 
original thesis.
We could stop here. In our view, the remainder of our 
critics’ paper does not really relate to the cybercrime 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, we will consider some of the 
issues below.
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Lifestyles revisited
In rejecting the cybercrime hypothesis, we observed that 
changes to the lifestyles of victims and offenders may 
warrant consideration, but would be a distinct hypoth-
esis. We wrote that “It is plausible that the Internet has 
changed lifestyles and culture—keeping potential offend-
ers and victims indoors thereby reducing their involve-
ment with contact crime and increasing guardianship 
of property.” (Farrell and Birks 2018: 3). A decade ago, 
one of us suggested a “changing lifestyles and routine 
activities hypothesis”, asking “Have the work and lei-
sure routines of individuals changed in ways that could 
significantly affect crime patterns? This could include 
house ownership [and] technological change that leads to 
new fashions and lifestyle changes … Felson (1998) sug-
gested routine activity-based explanations [for the crime 
decline] but otherwise the theory seems to have been 
largely overlooked.” (Farrell et al. 2010: 30). The possibil-
ity that crime declined because men spend more time 
at home and in domestic tasks, that deindustrialization 
is causing the labor force to move indoors, and that the 
internet causes more socializing at home, has been pre-
viously mooted (Alper et al. 2013), while switching from 
crime to computer gaming remains an un-evidenced con-
jecture (e.g. Griffiths and Sutton 2013). A review of crime 
drop explanations noted that “it is conceivable that the 
Internet has induced lifestyle changes for both potential 
offenders and potential victims (with consequent impacts 
on guardianship if everyone stayed home more) that have 
had a subsequent consolidation effect significantly after 
the crime drop began.” (Farrell et al. 2014: 457, emphasis 
added). Such conjectures posit non-criminal changes to 
lifestyles as causal.
We refer here to the lifestyle hypothesis for consistency 
with Hindelang et  al. (1978) and past practice in crime 
drop research. Note that lifestyle changes have occurred 
before and after the internet became popular. Note that 
since the internet has become popular, lifestyles have also 
changed due to other factors besides the internet. Note 
that some or none of this lifestyle change might have 
affected offending and crime rates.
The reason for revisiting the lifestyle hypothesis here 
is that our critic’s second main point appears to be to 
propose much the same thing while offering no addi-
tional evidence (there is a reference to a paper show-
ing lifestyle change occurring well after the onset of the 
falls in crime). Using the term ‘cyberspace hypothesis’ 
they suggest lifestyle changes due to ‘leisure IT’ such as 
pre-internet computer gaming may have reduced physi-
cal crime rates. But this is not original, as shown above. 
Further, we think they misuse the term ‘cyberspace’, 
which usually refers to internet-related issues, particu-
larly communication over computer networks. They give 
it an unconventional definition that includes pre-internet 
‘leisure IT’ (but, we note, the term is used elsewhere in 
their study as including internet-related activities). It 
could be  argued that the choice of a term so similar to 
‘cybercrime’, but assigning it a definition that involves an 
unusual and unclear usage, blurs definitional lines and 
introduces ambiguity.
Let us consider the lifestyle hypothesis further. Fifteen 
crime drop hypotheses were reviewed by Farrell (2013). 
Hypotheses were considered mostly because they had 
been the subject of previous empirical study. The reason 
that the lifestyle hypothesis was not among them, despite 
the author having discussed it previously (as shown 
above), was because there did not appear to be peer-
reviewed supporting evidence. To our knowledge, that 
situation has not changed.1 Let us consider the lifestyle 
hypothesis further using the ‘tests’ proposed in the 2013 
and 2014 studies. The lifestyle hypothesis seems likely to 
fail the ‘varying trajectories test’ because lifestyle change 
seems unlikely to account for, say, how burglary appears 
to have fallen a decade or more in advance of violence in 
the United States. It also appears to fail the ‘phone theft 
test’, because it seems inconsistent with the increase in 
phone theft that occurred while other physical crimes 
were decreasing. In addition, lifestyle changes seem 
unlikely to explain key data signatures identified to date 
such as the decline in forced but not unforced entries 
to households as burglary declined (Tilley et  al. 2015). 
Overall, then, while we are confident that non-criminal 
lifestyle changes occurred both before and in parallel 
with the rise of the internet, we suspect there is good rea-
son that nobody has, to our knowledge, offered evidence 
showing they caused the international crime drop. We 
emphasize that showing lifestyles have changed, and even 
showing some correlation with crime trends, is a long 
way from demonstrating a causal connection.
Multi‑causality, crime opportunities, 
and mechanisms
Our critics refer dismissively to a ‘so-called crime drop’. 
The crime drop provides the setting for their study, so 
this seems curiously self-contradictory. It also suggests 
they may not have considered previous discussions of 
variation in the crime drop and use of the term (e.g. that 
of Farrell et al. 2014).
Elsewhere M&M move to overtly criticize the secu-
rity hypothesis by asserting that crime drop explana-
tions should be multi-causal. It is our contention that 
1 Despite that, Farrell et  al. (2014) included ‘the internet’ as a crime drop 
hypothesis in order to clarify its implausibility, while Farrell and Birks (2018) 
responded to mounting speculation about cybercrime.
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the plausibility of an explanation should be determined 
not by a count of the number of hypotheses but by good 
theory and evidence. For example, the theory of evo-
lution by natural selection is not  inadequate because, 
by some definitions, it might be interpreted as lacking 
multi-causality. Likewise, the Big Bang explanation of the 
universe’s formation is not usually viewed as inadequate 
on the basis that it may lack multi-causality. Perhaps it is 
also relevant to the present argument that a single term 
and theory can encapsulate multiple mechanisms and 
sub-hypotheses. With respect to the security hypothesis, 
different vehicle security devices trigger different mecha-
nisms from each other and from anti-burglary devices, 
for example. That is, different security devices work in 
different ways in different contexts for different types 
of crime, following the reasoning of Pawson and Tilley 
(1997). Multiple other factors are involved: If door and 
windows locks reduced burglary, for instance, was this 
due to their increased prevalence, greater uniform cover-
age of access points (not just the front door), greater rou-
tine usage (windows no longer left open), secure defaults 
for modern locks, or the increased robustness of modern 
frames, panes, and security fittings (Farrell 2020)? These 
measures may have reduced offending through at least 
two causal mechanisms:  by physically thwarting access, 
or by deterring offenders who observe the presence of 
credible security and choose not to offend (Thompson 
et al. 2018). With respect to the crime drop, an avalanche 
of security measures, introduced in many different areas 
of life, has been suggested to be responsible (Clarke 
2016). Further, the debut crime hypothesis and keystone 
crime hypothesis, which were proposed alongside the 
security hypothesis by Farrell et  al. (2011), operate as 
related but distinct hypotheses. There is some prelimi-
nary evidence in support of these hypotheses which sug-
gest that violence fell as a knock-on outcome of declining 
property crime (Farrell et al. 2018), and significant poten-
tial for further research. So when M&M imply that the 
security hypothesis is mono-causal, we suggest they are 
mistaken. Of course, it is still possible that other fac-
tors also played a role in the crime drop, but this seems 
increasingly unlikely in the face of evidence support-
ing the security hypothesis, and largely refuting other 
hypotheses, that has emerged in recent years.
More generally, in places, our critics’ work appears 
confused. Three prominent examples should illustrate. 
First, they make the “critical observation” that
“the impact of cybercrime on the physical crime drop 
is not necessarily associated with a shift in the activ-
ity of certain criminals but, rather, with a shift in 
criminal opportunities from physical space to cyber-
space … [which] … has resulted in a new area of 
criminal opportunity in cyberspace that has affected 
opportunities in physical space.” (p. 3, emphasis 
added)
This seems to suggest that a crime opportunity is a 
physical entity that bounces around like a pinball. We 
suggest that a crime opportunity is any situation in which 
the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs of a 
criminal act. Second, they report that
“we are not claiming that the same individual who 
once stole bicycles now commits phishing (we ignore 
this, most likely that particular individual will not 
do so), but we do suggest that individuals who once 
found opportunities to steal bicycles now are finding 
more opportunities to commit fraud over the Inter-
net through their daily activities (e.g., fraudulently 
offering bicycles that will never be sold to the buyer). 
Therefore, the point we are trying to make is not that 
people’s skills have changed, but that global oppor-
tunities have.” (p. 3)
This appears to argue that offenders who switch from 
physical crime to cybercrime do so without using differ-
ent skills (‘not that people’s skills have changed’). If this 
interpretation is correct, it is hard to see how that could 
be
A possible alternative interpretation of the two exam-
ples so far is the following: The crime drop and ris-
ing cybercrime are independent trends caused by broad 
changes to crime opportunity structures. Again, though, 
this is our argument, and we took the italicized clause of 
the preceding sentence from the concluding paragraph of 
Farrell and Birks (2018).
Third, our critics report that “The mechanism [by 
which offenders substitute cybercrime for physical 
crime] is clearly evident: there are more opportunities 
in one place and fewer opportunities in another.” The 
straightforward problem here is that this does not specify 
a mechanism by which one change may have caused the 
other.
Conclusion
The argument and evidence collated here suggests that 
our critics misrepresented our argument and do not 
appear to offer anything new. It is not without some 
reluctance that we reply here, feeling obliged to do so, in 
the hope of avoiding further misunderstanding.
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